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4 Intro
I – Preliminaries
Intro
I first met Richard de Mulder during Bryan Niblett’s Advanced Workshop on
Computer Science and Law held during September 17-27 at Clyne Castle near
Swansea, in 1979. As the Castle was (and presumably still is) located in the
middle of nowhere, it sensibly sported a snooker room. Richard taught me
the rules of the game there, before consistently beating me at it during hours
otherwise lost, between workshop participation, socializing, meals and sleep.
We, Richard and I, and all the other participants in the Workshop had the
feeling to be present at a Big Moment. To use modern speak,1 we felt to be at
the tipping points of big events that would make the complex systems we were
interested in (legal practice and legal theory) race towards new equilibria with
computer-science results as the main attractors.
Since 1979, thirty-one years have passed. Over the years, our paths crossed ir-
regularly, mainly at conferences, in far-away locations. And somehow we never
found ourselves drawn towards the widely shared equilibrium paradigm for a
law-and-computer-science discipline induced by a strong, attracting, relevant
collection of computer-science results – as our shared expectation was, back in
1979. Why not? This is the big question I will attempt to answer.
Such questions are difficult in themselves, but especially so when they are to
be addressed in an essay, meant to celebrate a scholar and his career, at the
occasion of his formal retirement.2 So lets first get rid of any misgivings the
rest of the argument might otherwise induce. Richard’s contributions to le-
gal expert systems have been significant and his contributions to conceptual
retrieval systems are significant to the foundations and seminal to the applica-
tion of jurimetrics in an impressive manner. In short: I respect and applaud
Richard’s work and career. So let no one read disrespect in the questions I will
discuss, nor critique ad hominem in the arguments I present.3 My unhidden
agenda is to contribute, to the best of my knowledge, to our understanding of
why our dreams from 1979 haven’t come true yet by 2010. Such is my reply to
Richard’s recent appeal: “Jurimetics, Please!”4
At any moment in time, at any “now,” we can, while we exist, concurrently
look back and look forward. And that is usually what we do, performing an
1As for instance used by Miller and Page [30] and Mitchell [31].
2I assume Richard will materially continue to be scientifically productive, long after reach-
ing his 65th birthday.
3Doing so would be foolish anyway, as such disrespect and critique would be directly
applicable to myself.
4As the title of de Mulder et al. [8] reads.
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unsquare dance, facing the past while facing the future, muddling through as
best as we can. Let us assume that “muddling through” implies having both
dreams and the ambition to (help) make them come true. If we picture doing
so for the 31 years under investigation, we picture a dynamic process; in our
imagination we may represent it by a line (let’s call it the dream-realization
line), currently reduced to a line segment starting at 1979 and ending at 2010,
while “now” can be any point on it. Considering “muddling through” to be
scientifically inclined, we need to combine the results of two different methods,
one method for facing the past and one to face the future. Looking at the past
requires an apparatus to explain how “now” has evolved, looking at the future
requires an apparatus to design how our dreams can be realized. At any “now,”
while “muddling through,” we have to make and combine the etiology5 of the
current state of our dream’s realization and the blueprints6 for how to realize
what is left of them.7
I will reduce the discussion to a few selected dream states and to a few simple
questions and will be using the dream-realization line to dance along it at
will, to the virtual “nows” (or “dream-realization states”) that I can use for my
argument.
Perspectives
Imagine driving a car through Greece as a complete stranger, e.g., a Dutchman.
Every now and then you see a “50-kilometer sign” on a national road. At first
you comply. This leads to dangerous situations and honking and scolding
Greeks speeding by at least at a hundred kilometers per hour. Imagine you
are both puzzled and scared, and position your car behind a coach to find
out how the traffic signs in Greece are understood by a professional. This
way, you compose a small collection of rules describing generalities in Greek
traffic behavior. After, you know that when a Greek driver meets with a 50-
kilometer sign, it can be expected that he will speed on. And that, after about
one kilometer, an insignificant side road (or a similar source of danger) will
appear. And that, at that point, the Greek driver tends to reduce his speed,
only to immediately push down the throttle again once the danger point has
been passed. And imagine that you have come to realize by experience that
5I will be using Calvin’s “Darwin Machine” (see Calvin [4] and Calvin [5]) in conjunction
with Wright’s functional teleology (see Wright [48] and Wright [49]) as the most general
apparatus for etiologic reasoning.
6I will be using parts of Schmidt and Corvers [39], based on Wieringa [47] and Schreiber
et al. [40] as the general apparatus for design.
7In this paragraph I have employed the imagination (or: fiction) in the way Fuller [15] read
Vaihinger, that is: introducing and (later) getting rid of it during argumentation, avoiding
it in the conclusions.
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6 Perspectives
this small-scale knowledge collection showed life-saving functionality. My claim
is that knowledge of this type, that knowledge about regularities in behavior
by law subjects in the face of expressed laws, belongs in the domain of legal
theory.
The law-science perspective in legal theory
My perspective on science finds it foundation in the following assumption
Science, including “law theory,” can describe and can predict, but it
cannot prescribe.8
The assumption is self-evident to me and may be so to many: very few people
consider the work done by politicians, contracting parties, judges, legislators
or policymakers to be of scientific nature. Yet the assumption is controversial
among legal theorists. I will evade the issue as much as I can. In the mean-
time I will try to show where the assumption may lead. My second and third
assumptions provide the key:
Law theory shows that regularities in behavior (of individuals, groups
and institutions)9 can be described in rules, that it is possible in
principle to describe the etiology of these rules and that it is possi-
ble in principle to rationally guess where they lead to.
and:
Rules describing regularities in behavior provide insight into the ex-
ternal coherence of the legal rules we create as institutional facts.10
Let me now try and apply “law theory” to the “driving through Greece” case
mentioned above.
8I will use the term “law theory” for “legal theory under assumption 1” as mainstream legal
theory does not accept assumption 1. I consider this (combined with the necessity to avoid
Moore’s “naturalistic fallacy”) to be the main reason why legal theory does not and cannot
explicitly relate to the sciences. Law theory aims to describe and predict how normative
questions are answered and why, it does not aim to answer them; legal theory aims to answer
normative questions and, by doing so, does not accept the authority of description and
prediction (or from science). Mainstream legal theory considers “law theory” to be external,
and to belong to the social sciences (see Weinrib [46], for instance). Reversely, “law theory”
considers mainstream legal theories as (often wonderfully coherent) sets of beliefs that find
their (contingent) authority in its measure of popularity among fellow legal theorists. “Law
theory” is not popular among mainstream legal theorists.
9Greif [21] made me aware of the attention, due to the concept ‘generalities in behavior,’
also in law science.
10‘Institutional facts’ as discussed in Searle [41].
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The mainstream legal-theory perspective 7
Greece has proportionally the most traffic fatalities in Europe. It is conceivable
that the Greek authorities, aiming to reduce this problem, ordered the fifty-
kilometer signs to be placed well in advance. It is equally conceivable that Greek
drivers see through this design and apply their brakes only where necessary.
And it is also conceivable that the Greek traffic police are loathe to worsen
their reputation by booking drivers for not driving fifty or less at places where
it is not really necessary. We have a set of propositions about generalities in
behavior that fall under the scope of expressed law; their descriptive accuracy
may be tested; they are not of a normative nature: they belong to the domain
of law theory.
Why would we want to consider such propositions (when validated) to belong to
the domain of the legal discipline? Because we have laws that serve goals. Law
theory may inform about mechanisms and conditions that will help to bring
these goals about and about mechanisms and conditions that have the opposite
effect. Setting the goals for the law is not a law-science issue. Informing the
legislators and the judiciary about the efficacies of the mechanisms employed
is. So getting to know about them as much as possible is part of the discipline –
even if it makes us turn to art, sociology, economics, biology, computer science
and math. To mention an example: I consider the mechanisms Antanas Mockus
used as mayor of Bogotá to be in the domain of such law theory.11
The mainstream legal-theory perspective
Yet law theory is currently seldom explicitly applied in Dutch legal scholar-
ship. Much more common, Dutch legal scholars investigate what the law says
and what that means when we interpret it in the light of a case, and how the
judiciary tends to interpret legal provisions. The heuristic research methods
employed focus analytically on how the complex network of knowledge objects
within our legal system and their application by the judiciary can maintain
internal coherence.12 AndL this type of knowledge is indispensable as a foun-
dation for any attempt to apply law theory.
For, whoever thinks of the legal problems we have in 2011, for instance
• with regularities in ICT-service provider behavior and
• with regularities in ICT-service user behavior and
11See http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=fX7HBxLBZ28.
12Mainstream legal theory has an internal focus mainly because it treats validly promul-
gated laws like axioms, and does not investigate their quality. Apparently Hart won the Hart
[23]-Fuller [16] debate in the long run. My hypothesis is that law theory and legal theory can
only merge when legal theorists accept to consider valid laws as useful fictions, or theories,
in stead of axioms. Rather in the vein of Aumann [3].
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8 Perspectives
• with ICT services for legal institutions
might, in the vein of Lessig’s inherent ambiguity,13 point out that ICT-services
have become a radically new part of our institutions, our systems and our en-
vironments and that the exclusive positivist approach may, from its principled
internal position, simply fail every now and then because solving these problems
attack the internal coherence of our legal systems as they were. Then, we find
our legal systems in between consistent states, and this is the subdomain suited
for law theory.
The efficacy of law stands and falls with how the law is respected and accepted
by individuals (or not). Consequently, the extent to which the law is externally
coherent, coherent with the regularities in the actual behavior of individuals and
with its environments, is simply invisible when looked at through a positivist
lens. I therefore argue (with Richard de Mulder, I believe) that the mainstream
legal-theory perspective in general needs to grow towards scientific adulthood
by merging with the law-theory perspective as mentioned.14
Inclusive15 legal theory
For such an inclusive legal theory - law theory approach, three types of knowl-
edge are needed :
• About what the law says and what it was intended to mean (mainstream
legal theory).
• About how the law is usually applied by the judiciary (mainstream legal
theory).
• About what the regularities are in the (strategic) behavior of individuals,
where these regularities come from and where they are likely to lead to
(law theory, aspiring to be part of mainstream legal theory).
When we apply all this to the Law and Computer Science subdomain, we again
get three types of knowledge that are needed:
• About what the law says to the users of ICT services and to the providers
of ICT services and what it was intended to mean.
• About how the law is usually applied by the judiciary when adjudicating
issues involving users of ICT services or the providers of ICT services
and where these regularities come from.
13Lessig [27].
14Schelling [37] seems to provide an example.
15Inclusive as to include both the legal-theory and the law-theory perspective.
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• About what the regularities are in the (strategic) behavior of the users of
ICT services and of the providers of ICT services, where these regularities
come from and where they are likely to lead to.
Now this is the subject matter for the law and computer science domain. But
we are currently not looking at this domain directly. In this essay I focus on
how the law and computer science discipline (that studies this subject matter)
did itself evolve during a certain stretch of time. Consequently, for the cur-
rent argument I have to re-instantiate differently the three types of knowledge
required:
• About what the law says to academic teachers and researchers who whish
to establish and maintain a new discipline and what it was intended to
mean.
• About how the law is usually applied by the judiciary when adjudicating
issues involving academic teachers and researchers who whish to establish
and maintain a new discipline and where these regularities come from.
• About what the regularities are in the (strategic) behavior of students
choosing courses and colleagues looking for disciplinary or interdisci-
plinary cooperation, where these regularities come from and where they
are likely to lead to.
The positivist analysis
The first two issues are of the positivist kind. I can be very brief about them.
Dutch law allows universities to decide by themselves about what subdomains
they pursue, what courses for these subdomains they establish and what re-
search they support, provided courses and research are funded in a proper way
and are evaluated to be performed at a sufficient high standard of quality. Let
me assume that these standards are met routinely and need no further dis-
cussion. Then, the law does not say anything specific on the subject under
investigation. Apparently, there is quite some leeway for self regulation by
academic institutions and groups. The regulatory environment wherein law
and computer science evolved as an academic discipline in the Netherlands is,
accordingly, determined by the regularities in behavior of University and Law
School administrations. Enters the law-science perspective.
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10 The collection of 1979
Dream statement
Thinking a moment about how to rephrase our expectation from 1979 into a
dream statement that is so general, that we may have some hope to carry it
through the dream-realization states we may expect to encounter during the
time segment under discussion, I suggest the following:
Our dream is to find a widely shared, vital legal-theory paradigm
(including the law-theory approach), fit to address scientifically the
legal issues accompanying the use and the provision of a strong,
attracting and relevant collection of ICT-services.
The hypothesis is that the attractor force of computer science services would
‘naturally’ bully law theory to create such a paradigm. In hindsight we can say
it didn’t. I will be looking for reasons why such a paradigm has not emerged,
and for remedies in case we proceed pursuing this dream in the future.
II – 1979
Imagine “now” to be 197916 and let us look at the collection of ICT services
available to Dutch academics, a collection which apparently radiated sufficient
attracting power to lure us into joining the Swansea Workshop.
The collection of 1979
Anno 1979 we can be comprehensive. Computers are scarce (most universi-
ties have only one ‘mainframe’ computer). They have brand-17 and type spe-
cific operating systems [that do not need updates for removing vulnerabilities]:
standardization of services and interfaces is virtual nonexistent. Information
storage is provided by databases and file systems. For those happy few who
want to use them, there are tool kits for statistical computing (SPSS, SAS) and
computer languages to create applications. E-mail-, file transfer- and remote
computing services are finding their feet, a process that is hampered by the
absence of adequate network connectivity. Anno 1979 computer services are
16I am working straight from memory here, without indulging in verification. I believe to
remain close to the original – close enough to guard the integrity of my argument. Yet, as
memory tends to play tricks over time, I must claim the reader’s lenience whenever fact has
been replaced by imagination.
17IBM, CDC, and Digital were then visible on the market for computers.
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scarce, expensive and local. Commercial use is restricted to the administration
of big companies – important to legal theory is that the big publishers of legal
material have changed their production processes so, that computer services
are employed to prepare printing texts. Consequently, legal texts are becom-
ing available in digital form, ready to be analyzed automatically. Government
agencies also use computer services to support administrative tasks. Univer-
sities have computer services available, mainly to perform ad hoc computing
tasks in order to support scientific research.18
Attractor functions anno 1979
Anno 1979 we have a small, weak base of computer services, which nevertheless
proves attractive to at least some legal scholars. If I remember correctly, the
attraction is based on a combination of expectations about what computers
may accomplish.
One: legal theorists opened up to sociology and economics and their empir-
ically oriented methods: in Leiden both disciplines (legal sociology and
legal economics) had gained prominent institutional places in the faculty
at the time. The Leiden law school even boasted a local Computing Cen-
tre (which I headed at the time), mainly providing services for statistical
analyses performed by legal sociologists and by legal economists.
Two: some discontent was felt in legal-theory circles about possible incon-
sistencies in legal practice – inconsistencies that might become visible
through computer services that analyze the digitized legal information,
stored by publishers.
Three: legal theory was deeply interested at the time in making explicit mo-
tives and argumentation techniques, explaining how case law was in fact
decided and how its coherence was guarded and maintained, especially
in the face of seminal cases, heralding dogmatic changes. Besides the
18Anno 1979 we have no wide area networks, no personal computers, nor mobile telephones,
we have no web servers that publish web pages and can communicate with automated,
‘crawling’ web information collectors that in their turn communicate with sevices that support
access to individual pages through browsers. Neither are there web services to publish blogs
and twitters and to support social software services (like Hyves, Facebook, LinkedIn). Nor do
we have Wikipedia, Wikileaks, Sourceforge or any other co-operative ICT-supported services.
We do not have computer games, no streaming media services, no ip-based telephony and no
videoconferencing services. We have no web-based commercial and financial services and we
have no active content. And we have no commercial surveillance of our behavior for profiling
and for better targeted advertizing. We do not yet have spam or malware. We are living in
a differnt world.
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12 Emerging interdisciplinarity before 1979
opening up of statistical analyses directed to legal texts, especially the
expectations raised in the discussions on artificial intelligence were sig-
nificant. Hofstadter [24] published his bestseller in 1979; Loevinger [28]
and Turing [45] had paved the way earlier.
Four: the administration of legal research was very lean in 1979. What was
researched when was still decided by individual professors and guided
by their personal scientific interests, and hardly constrained by financial
guidelines. I had no problem whatsoever finding support for taking part
in Niblett’s workshop at the time.
Thus, the genuine attraction of a small, weak computer-services base in 1979
is explained by the theoretical expectations accompanying them, and the aca-
demic climate of the time. Both (expectations and climate) relate to perceived
values: openness (one), consistency (two), transparency (three) and a combi-
nation of scientific curiosity and freedom (four).
Emerging interdisciplinarity before 1979
Now allow me to stop focusing on ICT and Law for a moment, in order to look
around and discuss a few characteristics of the Dutch legal theoretical climate
in relation to multi disciplinary work.
Snow and Anderson
Snow [43] delivered his famous Rede lecture in 1959, discussing the widening
gap between what we now call the sciences and the humanities. The problem
was and still is widely recognized. In 1972, Anderson [1] suggested a certain
hierarchy in academic disciplines which may help to bridge the cultural divide
brought to the fore by Snow. My version of Anderson’s ‘more is different’ is as
follows.19
Hierarchical interdisciplinary relations
Anderson proposes that a hierarchy of scientific disciplines can be constructed,
depending on object-aggregation level: more is different. Crudely put: ther-
modynamics is different form elementary particle physics, because the objects
of thermodynamics are generalities in behavior of energy in working systems,
19I adapted Andersons idea to my purposes here. I do not think I have abused it, yet I
cannot be sure about that as my knowledge of the sciences is weak.
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Snow and Anderson 13
rather than generalities in behavior of elementary particles; chemistry is differ-
ent from both elementary particle physics and from thermodynamics, because
it is interested in the behavior of interacting atoms and molecules, rather than
generalities in behavior of elementary particles or of working systems. We can
assume a hierarchy: thermodynamics looks at the behavior of aggregated (in
systems) objects that chemists investigate, and chemists look at the behavior
of aggregated (in atoms and molecules) objects that particle physicists inves-
tigate. The laws of thermodynamics are different from the laws of chemistry
from the laws of elementary particle physics. In such a hierarchy there is a ne-
cessity for interdisciplinary coherence (or downward compatibility): the laws of
thermodynamics need be coherent with the laws of chemistry need be coherent
with the laws of elementary particle physics.
Anderson suggests that these hierarchies may reach into higher regions. Medicine,
biology and psychological function theory operate at a higher level than (are
more than) physics, chemistry and thermodynamics; economics, sociology and
anthropology operate at a higher level than (are more than) medicine, biology
etc. I assume that law-theory operates at the level of economics and sociology.
Consequently, law theory is more than, yet must be coherent with,
the sciences whose objects it aggregates for study.
[Of course, what is stated above is an idealized state of affairs. For one: most
disciplines are fuzzy, and span several levels. And second: the models and
theories of disciplines at lower levels may be open to improvement].
Lateral interdisciplinary relations
Anderson does not discuss this, but hierarchies may have different nodes (dis-
ciplines) at the same level. Between them there can exist lateral relationships
that may constrain and/or support lateral interdisciplinary co-operation.
My assumption is that lateral inconsistencies (anomalies between
law-system theories with accepted theories in the lateral sciences
like economy, sociology and anthropology) require attention and ex-
plication.
Scale-free models
Anderson’s hierarchy does not imply that at every level in the hierarchy the
methods and models applied are different too. Anno 1979 we considered
i
i
“Richard-short” — 2011/2/2 — 0:46 — page 14 — #14 i
i
i
i
i
i
14 Observations for 1979
• first order predicate logic to be a universally acceptable reasoning mech-
anism, or, when looked at the scaling levels represented in the hierarchy,
a scale-free reasoning model.20
• number theory to be a universally acceptable formal system for modeling
theories and for simulating theoretic behavior in computer programs at
any level of the hierarchy.
• statistical analysis to be universally acceptable as instrument to descrip-
tively investigate regularities in (relationships between) phenomena at
any level, provided that the null hypothesis refers to an explicitly accep-
tible distribution.21
And although available at the time, were not to my knowledge conversant with
• agent-based modeling as suggested by Von Neumann in the 1940s and
early on applied and reported on by Schelling [36] and, again, applicable
at any level.
Also in Dutch universities, we were opening up towards interdisciplinary work
at the time.
Observations for 1979
Anno 1979 the academic climate of Dutch Law Schools showed as relevant
characteristics
• individual scientific curiosity as main driving force,
• professional autonomy as main administrative force and
• openness to multi disciplinary cooperation as a resulting attitude, yet
limited by an extortion attitude towards Darwinian analysis in legal the-
ory.22
20Some caution is necessary here: when first order predicate logical reasoning would mix
objects of different hierarchical levels in one system, it would open itself to category errors.
21Quite recently, the upsurging interest in power laws as an important group of distributions
to be found when researching objects that may be linked in networks has rattled the cage
guearding the ‘standard disctribution’ somewhat. See also: Frank [14].
22In 1979, the publication of a bio-social research program yielded a huge moral panic
around prof. Buikhuizen, resulting in public disturbances and eventually in abandoning the
program.
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Anno 1979 computers were huge and expensive.
The attractor collection of computer-science services was small, weak and only
accessible to the happy few (corporations, government and universties).
The attractor collection of added values for law-scientific attention consisted
mainly of
• expected contributions to transparency of legal theory through modeling
legal consultation machines, and
• expected contributions to consistency of legal theory through modeling,
accessing and analyzing legal documentation machines.
Anno 1979, computer science and law was not institutionalized as a discipline
in any Dutch Law School.
Researchers attracted can be counted in dozens.
III – 1987
Let me now jump to another spot in the dream-realization line segment. Imag-
ine “now” to be 198723 and let us again look at the collection of ICT services
available to Dutch academics, a collection which, apparently, radiated sufficient
attracting power for each and every Law Faculty in the Netherlands to have
departments for law and computer science (I use this term as a family concept
- these departments all had different names and slightly different focuses).
The collection of 1987
Compared with 1979 there was one big difference: personal computing and text
processing. We still didn’t have networks.
Attractor functions anno 1987
The attractor functions of 1979 still apply, by 1987 appended by two forces.
23I am working straight from memory here, without indulging in verification. I believe to
remain close to the original – close enough to guard the integrity of my argument. Yet, as
memory tends to play tricks over time, I must claim the reader’s lenience whenever fact has
been replaced by imagination.
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16 Modeling elephants and modeling non-elephants in 1987
Five: personal computing was spreading quickly and everybody wanted to get
educated enough to be able to take part. By 1987 I ran the Law and
Computer Science department at Leiden, and on days when students
could enroll in a course we gave, they queued for several blocks, hoping
to get in (we had limited capacity).
Six: The feeling of urgency was rather general: students undoubtedly queued
all over the country and government had two years earlier (in 1985)
started to fund the creation of Law and Computer Science departments
in each and every Dutch Law school. The mechanism behind this funding
marks a change in the administrative freedom of Dutch law schools: due
to political steering the main funding was decreased, while the reserve
thus created was made available under the condition of being invested in
innovation.
Thus, the genuine attraction of a still rather small computer-services base in
1987 is reinforced by personal computing, making the computer-sciences ser-
vices accessible to virtually everyone. ICT-access was (and is) related to ex-
pectations of innovation and welfare. This force relates to another perceived
value: welfare (five). The other attraction force is more complex and marks
the introduction of political influence into Dutch academia. Law School re-
search innovation was made mandatory, its funding detrimental to the tradi-
tional departments, a mechanism that need not have done much for law-and
computer-science popularity within their Law School settings.
Modeling elephants and modeling non-elephants
in 1987
Around 1987 a debate on identity occurred within the law and computer science
community. One half promoted ‘legal informatics’ to form the kernel, the other
promoted ‘legal theory on the use of ICT-services’ to be the kernel. The debate
was never resolved; the law and computer science community simply adopted
both. The legal-theory part focused on questions like what the legal status is
of computer programs, and how privacy (‘data protection’) might be guarded.
The ‘legal informatics’ part congregated in the Jurix foundation, focusing on
expert systems, defeasible logics, computer service design methods and formal
linguistics. Richard and I belonged in Jurix. We both worked on our PhD
research, and somewhere around 1984 our paths forked. Richard went for
modeling linear phenomena (modeling elephants), and I got tangled in the
questions that must be faced when modeling non-linear phenomena (modeling
i
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non-elephants).24
I think Richard and I both recognize that linear modeling is (and was) well
within our grasp. Neither do we have disagreement about the proposition that
many legal phenomena simply are not fit to be modeled with linear means
(mainstream statistics, first (or rather: single) order formal systems and such).
Richards approach was and is, I think, that we should focus on those legal
phenomena that are fit for linear modeling, like rule-based legal expert systems
for ‘frozen’ interpretations, or for comparing legal texts and trying to identify
and compare their subject matter statistically. The work done in the law and
economics movement, finding its feet at the time, belongs in this category also.
I had chosen a research subject that didn’t allow for the linear modeling ap-
proach and crashed into the problem that modeling a legal practice in its ‘evo-
lution’ can be reduced to modeling series of first order systemlets, but that
their overall evolution (guiding how one evolved into the next) faces the non-
linearity of the non-elephant. My local solution was to investigate how, at
the level where systemlets were considered objects, their evolution could be
explained linearly, and how this knowledge could be integrated into the sys-
temlets in order to generate a simulated evolutionary process spanning and
explaining 70 years of probation-adjudication policies in the Netherlands.25
Observations for 1987
Anno 1987 the academic climate of Dutch Law Schools showed as relevant
characteristics
• individual scientific curiosity as main driving force,
• professional autonomy as main administrative force,
• political regulation as additional administrative force, and
• openness to multi disciplinary cooperation26 as a resulting attitude, yet
still limited by an extortion attitude towards Darwinian analysis in legal
theory.
24‘Modeling non-elephants’ is, so rumor has it, Von Neumann’s famous metaphor for mod-
eling non-linear phenomena, yet I could not get hold of a reference.
25My work had been focusing so much on formal systems and was so much steered by the
completely misguided way we pictured ‘artificial intelligence’ as a working fiction at the time
(I’ll discuss this elsewhere), that I didn’t notice the symmetries between my results with the
theories of Anderson [1] and Dawkins [7]. I also simply wasn’t aware of them at the time.
26The introduction of political influence into Dutch academia by making Law School re-
search innovation mandatory, while making its funding detrimental to the traditional depart-
ments may have had a chilling effect on the openness mentioned.
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Anno 1987 computers were a mixture of huge and expensive mainframes and
personal computers. In universities they were connected in local area networks.
The attractor collection of computer-science services was small, weak, yet no
longer exclusively accessible to the happy few (corporations, government and
universities), but accessible to virtually everyone through personal computing.
The attractor collection of added values for law-scientific attention consisted
mainly of
• increased and ordered use of ICT-services is related to (economic) expec-
tations of innovation and increased welfare.
• increased adaptive attention of traditional departments for the legal ques-
tions accompanying mass use of computer science services.
• expected contributions to transparency of legal theory through modeling
legal consultation machines, and
• expected contributions to consistency of legal theory through modeling,
accessing and analyzing legal data bases.
By 1987, the law and computer science discipline (further: LACS) had been
institutionalized in the Netherlands – its birth taking place around 1985.
Researchers attracted can be counted in dozens of dozens.
IV – Looking back from 2011
Let us change our “now” forward again, to the beginning of 2011. And let me try
to describe how the current situation has evolved using an etiologic reasoning
technique. Such a technique builds on the notion of what Calvin27 coined a
‘Darwin machine.’ It (or rather: my adaptation) allows for the identification
of the data structure needed for etiologic reasoning. What we will need are
instantiations for a genotype (a pattern), that metabolizes and can variate,
and can transform into a phenotype that metabolizes and can work, that can
replicate, that has a replicative cycle and that lives in an environment which
can select (influence) its replicative success. Survival and adaptation of the
pattern as a species is an emergent phenomenon. The phenotypes may be
grouped either as a species or in communities (institutions). These are the
standard elements of generalized evolutionary reasoning – for looking at how
27Calvin [4]
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LACS got to be what it is we need to instantiate these elements and track back
into history.
I suggest that our LACS researchers are28 a species and that our LACS depart-
ments are institutions that are populated by LACS researchers, who can repli-
cate when students choose to be so transformed29 and when they are selected
to become new LACS researchers. LACS researchers come in two varieties,
all academic: the law-science (LS) variety30 and the legal-theory (LT) variety.
LACS success is replicative success, leading to a growing population of LACS
researchers, or a substantial amount of LACS researchers with “influx/birth”
and “outflux/death” rates in some equilibrium. LACS-institutional success is
also replicative success, but dependent on willingness to participate (by LACS
researchers) and on willingness to continue providing an environment by Law
Schools.
At LACS’ birth, LACS researcher varieties were evenly spread over the LS
variety and the LT variety. Anno 2011 the distribution of LS and LT researchers
in LACS is skewed, strongly favoring LT researchers. As a matter of fact can
further be noticed that the amount of LACS departments is less in 2011 than
in 1987, and that the amount of LS researchers has steadily grown from 1987
till around 2000, and has remained more or less stable thereafter. How this
came about is what I will try to argue. Arguments are related to (changes in)
the environment, variation, transformation, work, selection and replication
The environment
• Openness of and to the legal discipline. For reasons mentioned before, the
legal discipline has remained an outsider in the most vital movements of
interdisciplinary research: concerning (1) generalized Darwinism,31 (2)
adaptive complex systems32 and (3) network theory.33 By 2011, legal
theory is virtually isolated from important interdisciplinary networks.34
28I will be speaking in terms of ‘is/was’ in stead of ‘can/could be interpreted as’ in Part
V for readability.
29Employing education.
30Actually this variety represents a whole class of varieties, I lump them together for
simplicity.
31Of course there are exceptions (see for instance Jones [25], the German Law Review
2008, Vol. 9 No. 4, the NJB 2009, 1009, afl. 21 and Zaluski [50]).
32Of course there are exceptions (see for instance Ruhl [35]).
33The effect was (unwillingly, I presume) inforced by economic mechanisms (to be discussed
elsewhere).
34Neither the Santa Fe Institute, nor the “third culture” network of the Edge Foundation,
nor Gintis, in his discussion of a unified social science (o.c.) mention legal theory or any
other name for legal discipline.
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• Carrying capacity for LS and LT researchers. In 1985, the Dutch land-
scape changed again, with the comprehensive government funding of
LACS departments everywhere. The ‘carrying capacity’ for LACD re-
searchers became larger. From 1995-2000, the landscape changed again,
when NWO (the Dutch national science foundation) substantially funded
law and information technology research projects. The amount of LACS
researchers peaked around 2000. From 1995 onwards, the dominance of
LT researchers over LS researchers became marked.
• Mass computing. Since 1993, the landscape changed in so far as in-
ternet started to become ubiquitous (first in the West). As a result,
some computer-science results turned into mass services and started to
dominate the legal scenery. With it, the value of answering positive-
law questions gained in number and weight. From 2000 onwards co-
operative, (semi) peer to peer services drew huge audiences (like Google,
BitTorrent), and somewhat later several very successful instances of so-
cial networking software (Hyves, YouTube, Skype, Twitter etc.) started
to emerge.
• ICT-abuse. With mass computing, mass abuse entered into the scenery,
creating a demand for legal work.
• Surveillance material galore. During the same period, it became increas-
ingly clear that the intrinsic value for the providers of such services was
to be found in analyzing and employing the digital traces left by the in-
ternet behavior of the users, mostly for targeted advertizing. In its wake,
government institutions started to access these data for the detection and
prevention of crimes, while cybercriminals used them for their purposes.
And halfway through the period cloud computing35 began its raise. All
phenomena mentioned create an additional demand for professional legal
attention.
• Law-School willingness to provide an environment was initially more or
less arranged by government funding in 1985. From that year onwards,
Law School funding became increasingly problematic in general. LACS
institutional replication became widely dependent on the additional se-
lective force of cost-effectiveness.
• Relationships with legal theory institutions. There is an additional issue
related to Law-School willingness to provide an environment: it concerns
the question whether or not the LACS LT-issues would not better be al-
located to LT-institutions for research. The issue seems to have remained
35Essentially: computing under surveillance.
i
i
“Richard-short” — 2011/2/2 — 0:46 — page 21 — #21 i
i
i
i
i
i
Variation (individual and institutional) 21
unclear for many issues of legal-theory interest. Understanding the ins
and outs of the (dynamics of the) “information society” has not been a
priority in many LT-institutions, except perhaps in those where intel-
lectual property rights or criminal law are focal.36 Consequently, many
LACS issues have been allocated to LACS institutions. Traces of a LS-LT
divide remain though. Often it is found difficult for those institutions to
cooperate on projects concerning their shared domains. Knowledge about
Computer Science services does not come naturally or easy to many LT
institutions.
• The Bologna process. After 2000, the academic education has been sub-
ject to a harmonization effort. This resulted in the Netherlands to make
the curricula more compact and to reduce the space for non-mandatory
courses severe, thus limiting the possibilities for the ‘extra’ education
required to prepare future LACS researchers.
All in all the changes in the environment do not seem to have made a decisive
negative impact on the evolution of LACS researchers and LACS institutions.
Relative to the other legal sub-disciplines, there does not seem to be much
difference.
Variation (individual and institutional)
Pre-academic education received. I assume that the predisposition for the LS-
and LT-approaches more or less coincides with the type of pre-academic educa-
tion received. In law schools, this education tends to be on the ‘soft’ side. Con-
sequently, the LT-inclined students substantially outnumber the LS-inclined.
Again, this need not be a decisive factor against LACS evolutionary devel-
opment towards a stable state. A stable state may also be reached when a
stable minority of new students is LS inclined, and it is a steady minority of
LS-inclined students (students who gained a decent science background) that
enters the Dutch Law Schools.
Transformation
Transformation equals education when focusing on researchers. Back in 1979,
LS and LT researchers qualified themselves. In other words, they were intrinsi-
cally motivated and auto didactically educated. There was no LACS education
anywhere, and computer science education was really scarce. Around 1985,
36Of late, the WikiLeaks panic has rattled the cage of those focusing on the freedom of the
press.
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these early adopters (who often earned their existence through university by
programming computer services) manned the new LACS departments and of-
fered LACS-LS courses (for the LS-inclined students) and LACS-LT courses
(for the LT-inclined students). From 1993 onwards, the number of the LT-
inclined students of LACS institutions grew steadily, while the number of the
LS-inclined students remained more or less stationary. In Leiden, anno 2011,
the ratio is currently something like 6:1.37
Work
I think that looking at the feedback cycles between LACS work and the en-
vironment there can be observed a trend towards a change in the demand for
LS-LACS professionals: towards an in-between discipline supporting a niche
market. It must be further assumed that the growing demand for the LT-
LACS variety supports a growing market for them.
Selection for success
The discussion of the role of selection concerning the evolution of LACS re-
searchers and LACS institutions spans at least five levels:38
1. the motivations39 for LACS research (internal to individual frames of
mind, yielding the emergence of individual frames of mind),
2. individual frames of mind of LACS researchers (internal to regularities in
LACS-researchers’ frames of mind, yielding the emergence of varieties of
LACS researchers and providing external feedback to individual frames
of mind),
3. regularities in LACS-researchers’ frames of mind (internal to LACS-researcher
varieties, yielding the emergence of varieties of LACS researchers and pro-
viding external feedback to individual frames of mind),
37We have approximately 120 LT students and approximately 20 LS students each year.
38Thus modeling tentavatively LACS-institutional requirements for etiologic reasoning in
patterns that may variate, be selected and replicate, while keeping in mind Anderson’s ‘more
is different’ obeservation, and while interpreting Anderson’s hierarchy to change levels when
the higher-level pattern is a phenomenon, emerging (as understood in complexity theory)
from grouping behavior at the level below.
39‘Motivations’ here refers to those (both conscious and subconscious) mechanisms that
we imagine to urge individual behavior, yet are not rational. They refer both to what Smith
[42] calls sentiments and Gigerenzer and Gaissmaier [17] call heuristics. They supposedly are
the results of what we imagine to be meant by Gintis [19] with gene-culture co-evolution.
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4. regularities in the behavior of LACS-researcher varieties40 (internal to
LACS institutions, yielding the emergence of LACS institutions, provid-
ing external feedback to LACS-researcher varieties) and
5. the general environment (providing external feedback to LACS institu-
tions, to LACS-researcher varieties and to the frames of mind of individ-
uals; partly emerging form their work and its inherent entropies, partly
just being there).
These levels and their interactions suggest a theoretical frame for an ‘eco-
logic’ system in Dutch academia where the focus is on the etiology of LACS
researchers and LACS institutions. Its tractability in action is undoubtedly
rather complex. I will nevertheless try and apply it intuitively to the question
at hand in the paragraph concluding our looking-back position. But before do-
ing so I want to suggest that at least the behaviors of the theory implied may
be an interesting subject for agent-based modeling simulation experiments.41
Not doing so makes this an essay, rather than a research paper.
Replication
Replication of LS-LACS researchers operates through education. There is,
however, a serious difficulty in the education of LS-inclined students in LACS-
LS subjects, when the subject matter is of the Computer Science kind. It
requires a lot of effort in a time where the Bologna process has reduced leeway
for students to gain education in subjects that are not considered to be in
the kernel of a discipline. In Leiden no more that 3.5 ECT can be made
available. This can be considered a severe handicap for adequately educating
LACS researchers of the LS variety. On the other hand, many high-level books
and video courses have come available for basic introductory courses on several
disciplines that do enhance greatly the possibilities for any LS-inclined student
to enter the field.42
40Which, I imagine, may be expressed in institutional value frames. I expect coherence
and rationality to be also part of them.
41See for instance Gilbert and Terna [18], Niazi et al. [32] and Macal and North [29].
42I would suggest for instance:
Basic literature: Hofstadter [24], Aumann [3], Frank [13], Ridley [34], Schreiber et al. [40],
Fehr and Gächter [12], Teulings et al. [44], Miller and Page [30].
Preparatory videocourses: Grimson and Guttag on computer science:
http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/electrical-engineering-and-computer-science/6-00-
introduction-to-computer-science-and-programming-fall-2008/;
Stearns on evolution, ecology and behavior:
http://videolectures.net/yaleeeb122f07_principles_evolution_ecology/;
Bloom on (evolutionary) psychology:
http://videolectures.net/yalepsyc110s07_introduction_to_psychology/;
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Replication of LS-LACS at the institutional level operates paradigms as its
patterns. And here, I think, we touch the main reason why our dream is in
trouble. It is hardly possible to think in terms of a coherent field when thinking
about LT-inclined LACS research. If each Dutch LT-inclined LACS professor
were to describe our research efforts as contributing to a shared paradigm in
terms of seminal publications, we would all come up with very different lists.
After 31 years we are still very much in what Kuhn43 would qualify to be a
preparadigmatic phase.
Looking back: conclusions
Etiologic reasoning is a form of teleological reasoning which may be construed
to have the structure (applying Wright [48]): patterns are that way because
they got that way, yet might have turned out completely different. Etiologic
reasoning discusses contingencies in the past, leading to contingencies that are
currently there.
The current state of LACS in the Netherlands may be as it turned out to be
because the emergence of ICT-services in the environment created a strong
demand for LS-LACS and LT-LACS researchers, which initially was answered
by a variation towards the LS-LACS inclined and a variation towards the LT-
LACS inclined. Within the dancing landscape created by continually inno-
vating ICT-services becoming ubiquitous and comprehensively connected, the
LT-LACS variety flourished by sticking to its already mainstream paradigm,
leaving adaptation to the legislator. Concurrently, the LS-LACS variety ex-
plored several paths (some of them proving to be dead ends), resulting in a
large, rather haphazard collection of very small sub-varieties. Replication of
these sub-varieties is considerably more costly than the mainstream variety
due to additional educational investments. Yet the demand in the environ-
ment seems strong enough for some of them to be selected for replication and
to survive in small niches. The emergence of a strong paradigm (of effective,
cooperative regularities in LS-LACS researcher behavior) might help make the
LS-LACS variety more resilient. Such a paradigm not being there may impede
survival of LS-LACS institutions, even where the environment also produces a
strong and attractive demand.
Assuming the current stable Dutch LS-LACS institutions to be at the law
schools of Amsterdam (VU, UvA), Groningen, and Tilburg, while those at Lei-
Page on coplexity theory:
http://www.teach12.com/tgc/courses/course_detail.aspx?cid=5181;
Polak on game theory:
http://videolectures.net/yaleecon159f07_game_theory/.
43Kuhn [26].
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den, Rotterdam and Nijmegen are less stable due to either leadership-succession
or to diminishing size, the overall conclusion must be that LS-LACS survival
is becoming critically vulnerable. In terms of etiologic argument the cause
seems to be that the LS-LACS institutions’ work did not lead to an emerging
and viable paradigm that generates theories that support comprehension and
that actually functions as a pattern, sustaining coherence of and co-operation
between institutions. This impedes both effective replication (‘fitness’) and
selection for survival by the environment.
V – The remains of our dreams
anno 2011
Our dreams of 1979, of legal practice and legal theory racing towards new
equilibria with computer-science results as attractors have only partially come
true.
Legal practice is adapting to these results, no doubt about that. Yet most
of the work involved is selected to be done by computer-science institutions.
The frequency of problems in this area, however, seems so create room for an
in-between discipline which LS-LACS researchers might fill, as many already
do. Consequently, I consider LS-LACS, LT-LACS and legal practice to be
reasonably compatible with our first dream. I will leave it at that.
Legal theory, on the other hand, has hardly moved an inch. It seems in a sta-
ble evolutionary state, serving the replication of mainstream legal professionals,
demanded by a greedy market. The amount and the size of the LS problems
involved are hardly noticed inside the worlds of the LT-inclined discipline.44
As a result we see other disciplines move and adapt to fill the gap. Biol-
ogy, medicine, economics and the behavioral sciences have become the most
important players. As mentioned earlier, serious cooperation between these
disciplines is flourishing, while cooperation between these disciplines and LT is
almost entirely nonexistent. Consequently, I consider LS-LACS to be seriously
incoherent with current mainstream legal theory, and our second dream to be
largely unfulfilled.
Neither the blind watchmakers emerging behind the Darwin machine and, nei-
ther the invisible hand emerging behind the price mechanism, neither we have
44Examples galore: we have no scientific LT theories addressing global warming, the north-
south, the east-west, the urban-agricultural or the digital divides. Later I will be using the
example of the huge amount of research cooperation, needed for gaining comprehension of the
relations between genetics and cancer, which seems to be incoherent with a world dominated
by current intellectual-property habits.
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managed our LS-LACS institutions towards instantiating the image we dreamt,
back in 1979. Lets make a plan.
VI – Looking forward
It still is now, the beginning of 2011. The most ambitious part of our dreams
remains to be realized. Thus it makes sense to turn to the future and ask
ourselves whether it still is worthwhile to pursue, and if so, how we can imagine
how the forces of LS-LACS institutions can be combined with the forces of the
two blind watchmakers in order to at least bring a part of it about. Lets find out
how we might design in order to make our dream come true at least partially.
Looking backwards is applying etiology, looking forward is applying design. I
will apply a method described elsewhere without further reference45 and I will
follow some of its milestones when discussing the design questions related to
our dream statement.
The dream
In fact, the whole of our old dream statement remains open:
Our dream is to find a widely shared, vital legal-theory paradigm
(including the law-theory approach), fit to address scientifically the
legal issues accompanying the use and the provision of a strong,
attracting and relevant collection of ICT-services.
So we are talking about a paradigm shift, towards a vital legal-theory paradigm
for scientifically approaching legal issues. We have to be clear about what this
means. My definition – combining notions by Kuhn [26], Popper [33] and
Aumann [3] – of such a thing would be as follows:
A legal-theory paradigm for scientifically approaching any legal issue
is understood to be a shared, coherent collection of scientific theories
that serves comprehension of the law in relation to regularities in
behavior of the judiciary, of institutions and of the public.
Working towards a design implies modeling. Any form of modeling and any
form of reasoning – also scientific reasoning – implies the employment of repre-
sentation, and thus the employment of fiction. In this, modeling and reasoning,
45See for this:Schmidt and Corvers [39].
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when written down, are parts of literature. We need then to distinguish be-
tween several kinds of fiction,46 of course I focus on scientific theories:
Scientific theories. I tend to agree with Aumann47 when he stipulates that
it makes little sense to think about scientific theories or models in terms of
truth. Successful scientific theories have one goal: to serve comprehension.
And comprehension is served by
• connectedness (the capacity to recognize patterns),
• unification (the capacity to explain many different things) and
• simplicity (its sparseness in basic structure and its applicability).
I add two additional well known characteristics that respectively serve the
legitimacy end the authority of scientific theories:
• falsifiability (á la Popper) and
• paradigmatic (á la Kuhn).
Thus: legal fictions may be scientific theories. E.g., Dutch law counts an
unborn baby for a person in inheritance contexts. This can be considered to
be a scientific theory as it serves our observation and understanding of certain
generalities in behavior of the Dutch judiciary in a way that connects, unifies
and remains simple. And can be falsified. And belongs to the Dutch LT
paradigm.
All in all, transforming our dream into reality is a daunting task. It not only
requires the specification of a substantial adaptation to an existing scientific
paradigm. With this, it requires to convince at least a substantial and evo-
lutionary stable variety of LS-inclined researchers to adopt it and to sustain
it.
46Other types of fiction may be lies and mental images. Lies are fictions employed to
cheat. The lyer knows an inherent proposition not to be true, yet hopes and expects that the
fiction presented will lead to unexpected and often unpleasant results for whom it concerns.
Framing evolutionary theory to claim behavior be predestined is such a lie in an interesting
sense. It employs the social-scientific theory of framing to gain popular support via a simple,
intuitively appealing lie. Mental images. I use this as a container family concept for all
results of modeling and reasoning that are neither scientific theories or models and neither
are lies. Usually, invoking mental images is an objective for the arts. Often, imagery is
employed in scientific argument, as metaphores may support comprehension. Of course the
line between the three types mentione in this context may not always be clear.
47Aumann [3].
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The demand
As mentioned, we have no inclusive, legal theories addressing many of the social
phenomena that rattle the cage of the external consistency of our legal system.
Let me mention just one:
• the huge amount of computer-science supported, distributed research
is needed for gaining comprehension of the relations between genetics
and cancer, yet yielding a quandary in a world dominated by current
pharmaceutical-industry and intellectual-property habits.
The issue is high on our political agendas. The interests are global (or transna-
tional). The demand is huge. But they are not being addressed by or towards
LT-inclined researchers. Many ideas about how to adapt our legal systems
are suggested by common sense, economists and (social) scientists, are decided
upon by political institutions and are the work of armies, police forces and
a kaleidoscopic, dispersed mangle of public and private institutions founding
most of their competences and powers in nation-state arrangements.
All in all, the demand is there, be it diffuse. It is not directed towards the
LT-inclined and there is no well-defined industry or institution (other then
LS-LACS institutions) to formulate requirements and deploy the results, other
then the invisible hand and the blind watchmaker. From our perspective, their
designing abilities are currently severely hampered by the results of our naïve
design efforts, polluting the workings of the environment and filtering basic
moral notions from the regularities in our market-oriented behavior. Reversely,
at the side of the potential producers, the LT-inclined are hardly interested
scientifically. A tall order indeed.
Institutional analysis
Productive institutions. Our dream has to be realized and organized by one or
more LS-LACS institutions. These may be linked to each other and to inter-
ested institutions from different disciplines in a goal oriented network. All of
them are supposed to be manned by LS-inclined researchers. All these institu-
tions are (1) elements of or Foundations related to Faculties and Universities,
who are parts of the academic systems of their countries and (2) subject to
peer-review mechanisms for their work to gain authority and influence.
Demanding institutions. We need not expect our direct environmental institu-
tions, the Law Faculties, to exert strong demanding forces: their mainstream
focus is on positive law and they are in an evolutionary stable state due to mar-
ket demand for their students. Yet their relative openness makes them willingly
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provide an environment for LS-LACS institutions, provided they are cost ef-
fective and provided they are not incoherent with the mainstream paradigm.
To convince them that LS-inclusive LT is an important adaptation will be one
of our objectives. But for strong and focused demand we will have to look
elsewhere. Most likely it can be found where (private or public) administra-
tions are both interested in innovation and face persistent computer science
and law problems, resistant to be effectively solved by mainstream legal prac-
tice. The innovative, cooperative, computer science supported research into the
relationships between genetics and cancers may serve as an example project.
Task-dependency sketch
The task-dependency sketch is a preliminary affair, presenting the contours of
a possible solution based on intuition. We can divide the tasks involved in two
phases: one for actually describing and implementing a new paradigm and one
for maintaining it and keeping it in production.48
Design, specification and implementation of the new paradigm. Design and
specification of the new paradigm is decided in the LRE phase. Were I the
project initiator, I would suggest that the organizations and the interdisci-
plinary approaches of both the Santa Fe institute and the Edge foundation
show a way worthy of imitation, mutatis mutandis. Thus I would try to or-
ganize a network, embracing a paradigm focusing on inclusive, scientific legal-
theory with attention for the differences between the regularities in behavior
of the legislator, the judiciary, the corporations and the public – a paradigm
that further investigates and employs the forces as provided by (subsets of)
etiology, network theory, complexity theory and game theory – all supporting
comprehension (as described before) and interdisciplinary cooperation.
Implementation of the resulting paradigm is an especially difficult issue, consid-
ering the stable state that mainstream legal theory currently seems to be locked
in, especially where it may well prove to be incoherent with mainstream legal
theory. Douglas’ analysis provides a theory about how conceptual anomalies
with axiomatics of an institution may lead to conflict (see Douglas [9], Douglas
[10] and Douglas [11]). Cohen [6] unraveled powers of ‘moral panics’ and Gitlin
[20] researched how ‘framing’ communication technique can help defend against
a new paradigm intruding yet also can help rattle the cage of stable states.
Assuming institutions with stable states to (internally) have shared interests
and values, one might consider these to be ‘institutional value frames.’ Some of
the values involved get a special status; they become the heart of the network,
48Arthur [2] might consider them to be the phases of combinatorial evolution and of the
Darwinian bottleneck respectively. Anyway, that seems a useful way to think about the two
phases.
i
i
“Richard-short” — 2011/2/2 — 0:46 — page 30 — #30 i
i
i
i
i
i
30
keeping the institution together. When institutional cohesion is voluntary (par-
ticipants do not fight or flee it),49 part of the institutional value frame may be
called ‘morality.’50 Social psychologists notice why the parts of paradigms we
consider to be moral are resilient to change:
“Morality, by its very nature, makes it hard to study morality. It
binds people together into teams that seek victory, not truth. It
closes hearts and minds to opponents even as it makes cooperation
and decency possible within groups.”51
It is not difficult to see that institutional value frames vary all over the world.
Most relevant to the LS-inclined is the research for basic, universal ‘emotional
functions’ or ‘receptors’ that may be tuned by cultural operation in order to
provide individuals with the moral ‘taste’ considered appropriate by the in-
stitutions they participate in. Knowing about these receptors and about the
mechanisms that may and may not change them will be important to the LS-
inclined.
VII – Conclusion
When I accepted the invitation to write an essay for the volume, celebrating
the 65th birthday of professor Richard de Mulder, I decided to try and un-
derstand our joint history in Law and Computer Science. My discussion took
considerably more time and considerably more space then expected or offered
to be available. If the essay is accepted for publication anyway, I am grateful.
While writing it, I made use of the methods and techniques available to us now,
and unavailable to us when we were needing them most. My main conclusion is
that we are currently entering an era where effective interdisciplinary work has
come within our reach. My analysis has shown how a relevant project might be
approached. Writing it down has made me decide to actually try and realize
such a project. This cannot be done solo. So here is my appeal to anyone
feeling the urge to participate.
Tell me.
Oegstgeest, January 23
aernout.schmidt@gmail.com
49See for instance Schmidt [38].
50In the sense used by Haidt [22].
51From Jonathan Haidt’s home page http://people.virginia.edu/~jdh6n/
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